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Abstract
A substantial body of accounting and finance literature has been devoted to the study of
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) dominated by discussions relating to the gains and losses
that accrue from transactions involving large public companies. This paper makes a unique
contribution to the literature by investigating the M&A experience of microcap businesses.
Transactions involving microcap M&A are substantially different to those involving large
companies on a number of dimensions. This paper explores the determinants of microcap
M&A success and pitfalls and problems from an integration perspective. Due to the paucity
of research in the area an exploratory research design is employed, conducting interviews
with five CEOs of companies that had each managed multiple transactions. We find microcap
M&As are successful when measured against identified goals but generally take longer and
cost more than expected. Further, culture and communication are key issues in determining
success/failure. We also find the in-house management of integration aspects is problematic
for these businesses and suggest this warrants further study.
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Introduction
Through the decades, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have been a popular strategy for
businesses seeking rapid growth. Accordingly M&As are one of the most studied areas in
modern corporate finance. A merger can be defined as combining two firms into one, with
the acquirer assuming assets and liabilities of the target firm while an acquisition refers to a
takeover of a firm by purchase of that firm's common stock or asset (Brealey, Myers &
Marcus 2003). It should be noted that the distinction between the two terms has blurred over
time. A significant amount of literature has focused on those who benefit from M&As, the
factors determining success or failure and, more recently, explanations of patterns in M&A
activity over time. This is not surprising given the number and value of transactions and the
impact on the lives and livelihoods of the people involved. In 2007 the year prior to the
Global Financial Crisis, the value of M&A deals globally totalled over US$2 trillion (The
Economist 2007).
Yet considerable differences still exist in the literature with respect to the definition
and measurement of M&A success and failure. The majority of market-based studies indicate
that shareholders of acquired firms generally make positive abnormal returns while acquirers’
abnormal returns are either not statistically different from zero or negative (Cartwright &
Schoenberg 2006). In contrast, accounting-based studies typically fail to find evidence of
improved performance after integration.
The traditional view is that M&As are undertaken to reap economies of scale or scope
or pursued by personal motives of management.
Such findings have led to an examination of the financial and strategic factors that
contribute to success. While these motives may still hold true it is increasingly acknowledged
that M&As can also be a strategic play for organisations in their effort to maintain a
competitive advantage by acquiring innovative products and businesses (Cefis, Ghita &
Sabidussi, 2009; Schraeder & Self 2003) or failure (Calipha, Tarba & Brock 2010). More
recently, there appears to be a stronger focus on integration process variables as well as
organisational and human factors (Cartwright & Schoenberg 2006). It is now commonly
recognised that “all value creation takes place after the acquisition” (Haspeslagh & Jemison
1991, p129).
This paper reports the findings of a small exploratory study into the M&A activities of
microcap Australian Companies and is the first study of its kind. Academic literature on
M&As has focused on transactions involving large publicly listed companies such as
Hewlett-Packard/Compaq, AOL/Netscape, Exxon/Mobil, NationsBank/BankAmerica, and
British Petroleum/Amoco (for example, de Camara & Renjen 2004; Epstein 2004), while
virtually ignoring unlisted and small companies. This paucity of research into small company
M&A was recently noted by Patzelt, Schweizer and Knyphausen-Aufsesse (2007). Metz
(2009) argues that small companies have strategic rather than financial value and transactions
involving small companies have different dynamics to those involving large firms. Microcap
companies have been ignored almost completely in the M&A literature, possibly because of
difficulties in accessing data. Microcap businesses, though, have recently come into
prominence. This is particularly evident in the area of biotechnology with larger companies
absorbing smaller businesses identified as incubators of new product research and
development as evidenced in the case provided by Patzalt et al. (2007). Accordingly this
study aims to place an in-depth investigation of microcap organisations within the context of
a wider understanding of M&As. The primary focus of the research is to examine the
dynamics of microcap M&As and investigate the determinants of their success or failure. The
study also attempts to explore the pitfalls and problems in microcap M&As from an
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integration perspective.
The paper is divided into several sections. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant
literature on M&A and Section 3 outlines the methodology employed in the study. Section 4
reports results and Section 5 provides a discussion of the research findings. Section 6
includes concluding comments and implications for future study.
Literature Review
Most of the literature on M&A can be broadly categorised into three broad streams: those
studies which consider the benefits resulting from M&A transactions; the factors determining
success or failure of M&A and, more recently, examinations of waves in M&A activity
(Kummer & Steger 2008).
The existence of waves or cycles in M&A activity has been noted in the literature for
many years (for example, Smiley 1981). M&A activity tends to increase in periods of
economic expansion and buoyant stock prices as seen in the most recent wave of mostly
horizontal mergers which peaked in 2000 (Bruner 2002). Several explanations have been
proposed for the variation in the level of M&A activity over time. Kummer and Steger (2008)
explain the causes of waves as due to lack of growth initiatives or organic growth options as
well as pressure from investors demanding ever higher returns. Excessive capacity and the
existence of a fragmented industry structure have also been identified as drivers for waves of
M&A activity (Weston & Jawien 1999). M&As occur rapidly as industries regroup into
fewer but larger companies in order to reduce costs and improve efficiency (Harford 2005).
Deregulation, such as the removal of anticompetitive legislation, may initiate industry
consolidation (Bower 2001).
It has been suggested that some M&As may be initiated by management with the
intention of fulfilling some private agenda such as empire building, or increasing personal
remuneration, status, power and prestige. Jensen (1986) proposes that takeovers are one way
managers spend free cash flows rather than making distributions to shareholders.
Accordingly, a reduction in free cash flow may avoid hostile takeover and ensure
management entrenchment. The general implication of these managerial motives is that many
M&As provide little benefit and may even be value destroying.
The issue of whether M&As benefit companies and who personally gains has
provoked a steady flow of research in finance and accounting. To investigate these issues two
research approaches have been employed in practice; event studies using share market data
and studies using accounting data. Most post-acquisition performance research has employed
event studies, thus ignoring other potentially relevant dimensions of firm performance.
In general, studies using accounting data fail to find any evidence of M&As providing
benefits such as improved profitability (King et al. 2004). Kitching (1974) argues that there
are serious limitations using accounting data to measure or judge M&A success. For instance,
the benefits of a merger or acquisition may take years to be fully reflected in earnings and are
likely to be revealed at different times for different companies. Target company data is often
lost or destroyed after the acquisition making performance appraisal problematic.
Furthermore, figures may become distorted due to changes in accounting conventions, tax
liabilities, and transfer prices (Devine 2002) while profitability ratios may be biased owing to
revaluation of the target company’s assets and the write-off of takeover-related goodwill. In
light of this, it has been suggested that estimates of operating cash flows before interest and
tax, rather than accounting profit, should be utilised.
Most studies using sharemarket data indicate that M&As at best do not add to
shareholder value and, at worst destroy value. Adams and Neely (2000) found that a merger
has no better than a 50-50 chance of creating value for the acquirer. A more recent global
54

Steen et al. | Microcap M & A

survey by KPMG (Colin & Spitzer, 2001) reported that 70 percent of the combinations
studied failed to add value. Shelton, Hall and Darling (2003) noted that two-thirds of the
M&A transactions they considered destroyed shareholder value, primarily because of
intended synergies not being realised. Other studies held a similar view that, while the target
shareholders generally fare well, most acquisitions fail to create value for acquirers (Carr et
al. 2005; Hazelkorn, Zenner & Shivdasani 2004; Mamdani & Noah 2004; Vester 2002;).
Appelbaum et al. (2000) claimed that, in general, M&A adversely affect the economic
performance of the new entity with estimates of their success ranging from 20-60 percent.
Schraeder and Self (2003) report that only 56 percent of acquisitions can be considered
successful when measured against their original objectives. In summary then, the success rate
of acquisitions in meeting both firm and shareholder expectation is very low (Beard & Zuniga
2006).
The poor performance of M&A has provoked a steady stream of research for the past
two decades that focuses on understanding the factors that lead to M&A success or failure.
As Tarba and Brock (2010, p.2) note, there is a “need to continue to research in depth and in
breadth the parameters that influence the overall M&A deal success”. Research has
considered pre-acquisition issues leading to failure including paying the wrong price, the
wrong method of payment, buying for the wrong reason, selecting the wrong partner or
target, and buying at the wrong time (Schraeder & Self 2003). Over-optimism (Lynch and
Lind, 2002), poor strategic rationale behind the deal (Schraeder & Self 2003), lack of
knowledge of industry or target (Early 2004; Porrini 2004; Zollo & Singh 2004), and little or
no experience of acquisitions (King et al. 2004; Nguyen & Kleiner 2003; Porrini 2004; Zollo
& Singh 2004) are among the commonly cited causes of failure. Even though overcoming
these factors might lead to M&A success a majority of studies conclude that post-acquisition
factors such as post-acquisition planning (Adams & Neely 2000; Carr et al. 2005; Huang &
Kleiner 2004; Lynch & Lind 2002; Mamdani & Noah 2004; Schraeder & Self 2003), poor
management and leadership (Marks 1997; Nguyen & Kleiner 2003), and the need to gain the
co-operation and commitment of employees (Arnold 2005), are critical in determining
success. Rikard and Finkelstein (1999) also indicates the importance of non-quantifiable
elements such as human reactions and organisational factors in determining success.
In light of the close association between people and success revealed by the research,
an emergent and growing field of enquiry has been directed at understanding the cultural
aspects of M&A and the behavioural response of the employees involved. For example, in a
worldwide survey in 1998/99 by Watson Wyatt, retention of talent, communication and
integration of cultures were rated as the three most critical activities in the integration plan
(Devine 2002). Poor cultural fit or lack of cultural compatibility have become much-cited
reasons for M&A failure (Beard & Zuniga 2006; Bijlsma-Frankema 2001; Cartwright &
Schoenberg 2006; Huang & Kleiner 2004; Lynch & Lind 2002; Shelton et al. 2003;
Teerikangas & Very 2006). Furthermore a by-product of many, if not most M&As, is that,
target firm executives experience considerable stress causing an average of almost 70 percent
to depart in the five years following completion (Schraeder & Self 2003).
Another critical factor that has received increasing attention in the literature is the
integration process. The opportunity for mergers to fail is greatest during the integration
phase (Adams & Neely 2000; Carr et al. 2005; Huang & Kleiner 2004; Krell 2001; Mamdani
& Noah 2004; Nguyen & Kleiner 2003; Zollo & Singh 2004). Poor integration often results
from weak management, strategy or communication (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Dixon 2002;
Huang & Kleiner 2004; Schraeder & Self 2003) which generates employee stress and
resistance towards change, low morale, cultural differences, and lack of clear vision (Early
2004; Nguyen & Kleiner 2003; Schraeder & Self 2003; Teerikangas & Very 2006; Zollo &
Singh 2004). The creation of a common mindset, linking people’s values with company
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culture has been said to be one of the most important requirements for a successful merger
(Appelbaum et al. 2000).
Additionally, matters such as the speed of integration (Angwin 2004; Lynch & Lind
2002; Roberts 1999; Vester 2002) and outsourcing various integration functions (Appelbaum
et al. 2000; Early 2004; Linder 2005) have been noted as important in determining the
success of M&As. The continuing ability to focus on sales and customers (Carr et al. 2005;
Huang & Kleiner 2004), cost-based synergies versus revenue-based synergies (Early, 2004),
and target company status, such as whether private or public (Hazelkorn et al. 2004), are also
identified as important determinants.
According to Nguyen and Kleiner (2003), merger success correlates directly with the
level and quality of the planning involved. In addition, Lynch and Lind (2002) claim that
many transactions fail or suffer significant setback as a result of insufficient due diligence
performed on the target at the pre-deal stage. Devine (2002) notes that the earlier and more
thoroughly the program is mapped, the greater the odds of ultimate success. Further, Vester
(2002) emphasises the importance of flexibility and innovation in dealing with the inevitable
surprises that occur during integration.
Obviously, the success or failure of a merged entity depends on its ability to integrate
effectively the two previously independent entities and to operate as a coherent corporation.
Huang and Kleiner (2004) and Krell (2001) note that poor integration can destroy company
value. Alternatively, Zollo and Singh (2004) identify that a high level of integration between
two merged firms can significantly enhance performance. Schraeder and Self (2003)
underscore four important contextual factors which impact on organisational integration.
These are the integration of information systems of the constituent firms, cultural
compatibility, communication, and people-related factors, such as shared goals, vision and
stress. Of these factors cultural compatibility is perhaps the most frequently discussed in the
literature.
Corporate culture encompasses the formal and informal decision-making processes
that take place in the hierarchy and the manner in which people at different levels within the
organisation interact with one another (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Teerikangas & Very 2006).
How personnel are selected, trained, rewarded and moved through the organisation’s
hierarchy and the inevitable changes that ensue are also important features (Appelbaum et al.
2000). Culture also includes routine aspects such as expected work times, dress codes,
rewards and recognitions, hiring and termination practices, titles, customer service
orientation, employee loyalty, how information is communicated and how conflict is dealt
with (Beard & Zuniga 2006; Schraeder & Self 2003). In essence, a company’s culture is its
personality commonly framed as, “the way we do things around here”, which differentiates
one organisation from another.
Organisational culture is regarded as important in determining an individual’s
commitment, satisfaction, productivity and longevity within the organisation as well as
understanding the organisational climate (Teerikangas & Very 2006). Organisational culture
is indeed holistic, soft, and difficult to change because it has an historical basis and is socially
constructed.
When organisations merge they not only merge their buildings, plants and equipment,
but also their individual structures, people, policies and cultures (Appelbaum et al. 2000).
Carroll and Harrison (2002) assert that the cultural integration of two organisations depends
on the compatibility of their respective cultures. Mergers are about compatibility which
means finding agreement about whose organisational structures, values and policies will
prevail and who will be the dominant partner (Arnold 2005). Studies have identified cultural
difference as a critical factor in prolonging integration and causing synergy milestones to be
missed which hinder the realisation of anticipated benefits from the transaction resulting in
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poor corporate performance (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Beard & Zuniga 2006; Schraeder & Self
2003). Indeed, cultural compatibility is consistently rated as the greatest barrier to successful
integration (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Huang & Kleiner, 2004; Lynch & Lind 2002; Schraeder
& Self 2003).
Appelbaum, Roberts and Shapiro (2009) note the importance of management
analysing its own cultural traits as a guide to selecting a combination partner and recognising
and resolving cultural misunderstandings. Accordingly Schraeder and Self (2003) promote
the importance of undertaking a cultural audit prior to acquisition to identify issues that
should be managed during M&A and incorporated in the integration plan. Clemente and
Greenspan (1999) believe that without a new set of cultural integration competencies, two
diverse organisations are unlikely to discover the common ground to form the basis for a new
culture from which synergistic solutions can emerge.
A key requirement of successful cultural integration is effective communication.
Early and frequent communication of a realistic assessment of the facts (rather than being
overly optimistic) not only with employees but also customers, partners, investors and the
media is frequently associated with successful M&As (Appelbaum et al. 2000). The key
challenge for communication is to resolve uncertainty quickly, particularly possible staffing
changes, to significantly reduce employees’ stress and maintain their effectiveness at work
(Arnold 2005; Nguyen & Kleiner 2003; Schraeder & Self 2003). As time elapses without
timely and appropriate communication employees settle back into the former culture which
may delay the post-merger integration.
Companies often slow the pace of integration in the desire to respect the culture of the
acquired firm. However, adopting a slow approach to integration may allow momentum and
enthusiasm to dissipate (Arnold 2005). Natural inertia sets in (Lynch & Lind 2002) as
management delays the inevitable “people decisions”. However, Huang and Kleiner (2004)
indicate that delayed integration causes greater uncertainty as everyone in both firms “knows
what’s coming”. Moving and integrating quickly may then reduce the length of time for
employees to experience uncertainty, as well as reduce the exponential effect of the rumour
mill, thus enabling the creation of supporting organisational structures (Angwin 2004). Rapid
integration also serves to reduce exposure to the uncertainties of the external environment, as
well as to reduce the time available for competitors to respond to the new organisation,
thereby increasing the competitive advantage of the new entity.
Homburg and Bucerius (2006) propose that the benefits of speedy integration depend
on the magnitude of internal and external relatedness between firms. External relatedness
concerns target markets and market positioning in terms of product quality and price. If target
markets are highly related then there is a high potential for synergy realisation. If there is a
low level of external relatedness with respect to market positioning then a speedy integration
may reduce customer uncertainty and improve the chance of success of the M&A. Internal
relatedness concerns factors such as management style, pre-merger performance and strategic
orientation. Homburg and Bucerius (2006) argue that low internal relatedness can be
detrimental for M&A success due to employee resistance and lower employee retention.
In addition to speed of integration, several studies have examined the effect of
acquirers’ prior experience on acquisition performance indicating that a lack of M&A
experience may contribute to failure (Appelbaum, et al. 2000; Nguyen & Kleiner 2003).
Early (2004) and Porrini (2004) argue that experienced acquirers can reapply lessons learnt
from past acquisitions to facilitate processes for the identification of issues and facilitate
integration of acquired firm resources. This contrasts with the lack of relationship between
experience accumulation and acquisition performance observed by King et al. (2004) and
Zollo and Singh (2004).
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M&As require senior management to turn their attention away from their daily duties
and focus on managing the integration, requiring substantial commitment and time. M&A
therefore brings the challenge of running the business while simultaneously managing the
transaction and subsequent integration (Appelbaum et al. 2000).This may be particularly
challenging for small organisations with limited managerial resources. Many researchers
emphasise the importance of ensuring a focus on business and customers throughout the
M&A process. It has been observed that, shortly after an M&A many organisations
experience lower sales as well as increased complaints about customer service (Huang &
Kleiner 2004). Therefore, the challenge for managers is to maintain the standards of sales and
service to meet customer expectations while ensuring successful and timely integration.
In small organisations with limited in-house resources it may be necessary to
outsource various functions during an M&A. Schraeder and Self (2003) posit that involving
credible outside consultants or resources can educate management on the plethora of issues
involved with the integration process and avoid integration problems. Outsourcing finance
and accounting, treasury, tax, and information technology processes may allow managers to
avoid distraction during integration (Linder 2005). Contrary to this view, Bruner (2004)
provides evidence that outsourcing integration does not significantly improve M&A success
rates.
Another factor related to M&A success concerns the financial objectives of the
transaction. Most firms focus on revenue-enhancement opportunities rather than costreduction, however, acquirers tend to do a better job of making estimates of cost-based
synergies than they do of estimating revenue-based synergies (Early 2004). As costs are
under the acquirer’s control management can decide to spend or not to spend, thus it is easier
to reduce costs than increase revenue. On the contrary, revenue synergies tend to be much
more difficult to estimate because there is great reliance on how customers and competitors
will react.
Finally, M&A success or otherwise has been studied in the context of company
trading status. Hazelkorn et al. (2004) find that when the target is a publicly traded firm,
acquirers experienced short-term returns of –2.3 percent around the acquisition and an
industry-adjusted –4.4 percent for the following two years. In contrast, transactions in which
the target was a private firm led to median short-term excess returns of 1.9 percent and
median long-term excess returns of 4.2 percent. Two possible explanations were advanced
for this pattern. First, acquisitions of public firms are typically more complex in nature and
thus more prone to integration problems compared to private transactions. In the latter,
acquirers do not tend to end up with the infrastructure and overheads of the target, thus
facilitating post-merger integration. Second, acquisitions of public firms usually occur at a
premium to an already-established share price. Indeed, private firms can sometimes be
purchased without a considerable premium because no established public valuation
benchmark is available.
Methodology
A review of the relevant literature reveals that from an acquirers’ perspective the success of
M&As in general, and from an integration aspect in particular, is poor. Further, the literature
notes several factors related to M&A success including management experience, cultural
similarity and effective communication. We question whether these findings can be
generalised to microcap M&A given that the extant literature focuses almost entirely on large
public company transactions. There are two broad research questions to be addressed in this
explanatory study. Firstly, what are the underlying determinants of microcap M&A success
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or failure? Secondly, given the importance integration plays in the extant literature, what are
the pitfalls and problems of microcap M&A from an integration perspective?
Our method is to study a small number of acquirers’ recent experiences of M&As in
detail rather than conduct a survey of a large number of organisations. This approach would
elicit comprehensive responses enabling a more nuanced understanding of the issues involved
to determine if any patterns replicate themselves by looking for common themes in the
acquirer’s experiences. The desire for depth and a pluralist perspective required that the
number of companies to investigate be fairly small (Meyer 2001). The benefit of using such a
small sample is the opportunity to gain a deeper insight into the full range of business, social,
and personal issues (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007).Our focus on the acquiring firm,
instead of the target, is influenced by Zollo and Singh (2004) who observed that learning
processes and post-acquisition decisions are housed primarily with acquirers.
Given the paucity of research on the issue, an exploratory research approach is
perceived to be appropriate in the conduct of this study. As we started with general research
questions and broad models for investigation (Eisenhardt 1989) we employed this
methodology rather than following a traditional grounded theory approach to theory building
(see Glasser & Strauss 1967). Saunders et al. (2007) note that an exploratory study is an
appropriate method of determining what is happening, to seek new insights, ask questions,
and assess phenomena in a new light. The advantage of this approach is its flexibility and
adaptability. The flexibility inherent in exploratory research means that our focus could
became increasingly narrower as the study progressed arriving at specific conclusions based
on generalisations. Following the recommendations of Yin (1994) and Eisenhardt (1989) we
employ an exploratory case study methodology using pattern matching of the five interviews.
After a review of the literature on M&A integration and success or failure, a draft list
of questions was prepared and forwarded to a highly experienced director of an M&A
advisory group with over 12 years M&A experience to provide further comment and insight.
The final list of semi-structured questions was then finalised and sent to five CEOs who were
randomly selected current clients of the advisory group and who had consented to participate
in the study (The list of questions is found in Appendix A). To ensure confidentiality we did
not disclose the identity of the advisory group, CEOs or companies involved. The use of
semi-structured interviews was employed to ensure greater depth and freer more open
responses from interviewees. Also, interviews were carried out in such a way as to elicit open
responses and volunteering of information that was not covered in the pre-designed interview
protocol. Each of the five interviewees is the CEO of a Micro-Cap acquirer who had
undertaken multiple M&A transactions during the period 2000-2007. Following the
distribution of the interview questions, and allowing time for the CEOs to reflect on them, an
interview was conducted with each CEO. These were facilitated by a single investigator,
audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed.
Consistent with Saunders et al.’s (2007) suggestion for the need to use and triangulate
multiple sources of data we accessed secondary data via media reports, company reports, and
press releases. In most cases, the firms’ websites proved helpful in compiling such an
overview since they typically listed the firms’ past acquisition history in press releases.
Cross-checking of facts presented in the interviews with secondary data allowed triangulation
across various data sources, hence data verification.
Despite the limited number of interviews the CEOs represented a significant body of
experience in microcap M&As. Of the five companies involved in the interviews one had
been involved in over ten acquisitions, another in a total of ten acquisitions, another more
than six, and the other two companies in two acquisitions each. Each CEO had been present
in their respective companies during all of the transactions. The five firms were involved in
biotechnology, communications, digital media and entertainment and transport services. In
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terms of size, we define the five firms as microcap firms with two firms generating annual
revenue of between $30 and $50 million each, and the other three firms generating revenue of
$100 - $120 million each. Firm revenue has been used as a proxy for market capitalisation as
the firms considered were not publicly traded. Each of the companies in the study and their
targets met the general definition of microcap being a company outside the ASX 300 (Peters
2011). A more precise description of microcap is given by Dimson and Marsh (2001) who
define microcap equities as the smallest one percent by cumulative value of all equities. Each
of the companies in our study meets this definition.
We asked CEOs to focus on their most recent transaction experience and encouraged
them to provide open and multiple responses where appropriate. The target firms are all in the
same industry as their acquirers and all operate in Australia.
Results
Motives for Merger/Acquisition
Many motives for M&As are proposed in the literature. Four of the respondents (CEOs A, C,
D, and E) mentioned that the primary reason for the acquisition was to add complementary
products and services. Two of these (CEOs C and E) also mentioned the desire to achieve
financial and operating synergies. In addition, geographic expansion was mentioned twice by
CEOs A and C, while another, CEO B, cited the acquisition of intellectual property for
product development. These findings could be considered to be at odds with more recent
studies such as that by Maybeck and Bains (2006) in the UK who reported that M&A
transactions involving small firms were mainly motivated by a desire to improve shareholder
returns rather than taking advantage of business opportunities or acquiring new technology.
M&A Success
Given that the firms studied were not listed, success or failure could not be measured in terms
of shareholder return. CEOs A, C, D and E indicated they defined success in terms of
improved financial performance through increased ROI and/or EBIT, NPV or attaining or
exceeding some budgeted goals. Additional metrics which received one mention by each of
CEOs A, B and C included increasing client numbers, removing outsourcing, raised company
profile, acquiring new technology, and retaining key employees. It was noted by CEO B that
success must be:
“defined by the purpose of the acquisition”.
Interviewees were asked what they thought were the main factors that contribute to
M&A success or failure. Consistent with the general M&A literature the most frequently
noted response was cultural issues which were mentioned by CEOs A, C and D. Strategic fit
(CEOs A and B), adequate planning (CEOs B and E) and understanding of the target business
(CEOs A and E) were each mentioned twice. Other factors which were each cited once
included getting target staff to change to their new circumstances (CEO A), a loss of
momentum (CEO A), inadequate communication (CEO C), over optimism (CEO C) and, in
the case of an acquisition involving a family business, a willingness of all of the family
members to co-operate (CEO A).
In terms of their most recent M&A transaction CEOs B, C and D indicated that they
had been successful when considered against initial purposes. CEO A reported their results
were mixed while CEO E said it was too soon to judge. This appears to be a higher level of
success than generally reported in studies involving public companies (Adams & Neely 2000;
60

Steen et al. | Microcap M & A

Appelbaum et al. 2000; Carr et al. 2005; King et al. 2004; Mamdani & Noah 2004; Schraeder
& Self 2003; Vester 2002). The rate of success appears consistent with other studies of
private companies’ M&As (for example, Hazelkorn et al. 2004). However, it should be noted
that many private companies studied in the M&A literature are still large concerns and the
companies investigated in this study are very small by comparison.
With regard to their experience of M&A transactions in general CEOs were asked
whether the acquisitions met their financial performance expectations. CEOs A and E stated
that half of the acquisitions they had been involved in were above expectations and half
below. CEOs B and D stated that their expectations were met and CEO C stated that their
acquisitions significantly outperformed expectations. In general therefore it can be inferred
that the M&As undertaken were successful in meeting acquirer’s financial expectations. As
all of the CEOs interviewed had been involved in multiple transactions we cannot rule out
that their past M&A experience contributed to this success.
Consistent with existing literature all five CEOs noted that cost reduction is more
easily achieved than increased revenue. Two of them noted however that cost reduction is a
short term proposition while revenue growth is harder and takes longer but is the ultimate
goal of M&A.
Culture
As noted in Section 2 people and cultural issues are regularly cited as the main problems in
the M&A integration process. With respect to the importance of culture CEO A mentioned
the cultural fit of the vendors, and the ability to fully understand their point of view during
the due diligence process as factors critical to success. CEO A also noted the importance of
maintaining staff loyalty and morale, while CEO C mentioned maintaining the customer
relationship. With respect to the management of the target or acquired company CEO E
commented that:
“The unwillingness of management or the inability to get management to shift to a
new paradigm, new operational processes, means that we couldn’t move as quickly as
we like.”
With respect to how the target’s and acquirer’s employees coped with organisational
changes responses varied. CEOs A and B said they thought most employees didn’t think it
was a problem as, although some employees left, others saw the benefits of working in a
larger organisation. CEOs C and D mentioned that the target company’s employees did not
typically welcome takeovers and often needed to be reassured as to their continuing
employment and conditions. CEO E noted:
“what we found was that if we kept them (target staff) busy, then they had less time to
worry about, to resist, or to be overly negative against it”.
CEOs were asked if there was a divergence in cultures between the target and acquirer
and how this was resolved. CEOs A, B, C and E answered that it was an issue in all the M&A
transactions their companies had been involved in while CEO D noted that they were able to
resolve it by having appointed a “cultural champion” to guide the cultural fit in all
acquisitions. Consistent with the findings of Schraeder and Self (2003), none of the
interviewees considered the cultural “fit” or analysed cultural traits with a cultural fit audit
prior to the acquisition.
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Communication
Consistent with the existing literature on M&A (for example, Appelbaum, et al., 2000), all
five respondents acknowledged the importance of clear and frequent communication to
reduce employee stress, integrate cultures and retain customers. As CEO B noted:
“Communication is a key factor, particularly in cases with different cultural
backgrounds.”
CEO D identified communication as the single most important factor in the M&A
process. CEO E said it was second only to having clear objectives, while CEO A said it was a
key factor. CEO C noted that it is the type of communication that is important with face to
face communication especially critical. This aspect has been noted in the literature (for
example Dixon 2002).
Integration
While all firms in the study had used the same Corporate Advisory firm to identify targets he
researchers were interested in finding out the extent of outsourcing integration activities as
this would have a direct bearing on the success or otherwise of the transaction. The use of
outsourcing in integration activities was limited in all cases. CEO D (the largest company)
stated that the company had all the required expertise in-house so they did not need to
outsource any functions. In his opinion:
“What can be done internally should be done internally and if you need more staff
resources then you have to hire rather than outsource”.
CEOs A and C stated that they did not outsource as they feared losing control over the
process. CEO E stated they outsourced HR as they did not have a full time HR person and
noted that:
“With many or most small companies there is not enough money to hire someone to
bed the M&A down”.
CEOs, A, C and E said integrations had generally taken longer than expected. On the
basis of their experiences CEOs B and C reported they thought that it takes two years on
average to complete the whole integration process while CEOs A, D and E estimated 12
months on average. CEO C felt that he should have reduced timelines and pushed the
integration more quickly. Apart from the largest company which stated that they had set and
largely met their timelines, the other companies did not adopt strict timelines or rigid
schedules. CEO C noted that, as their existing staff were already in place and working in the
business, it did not matter if integration took longer than first thought as “you’re paying them
anyway”.
CEOs A, C and E said they underestimated the effort required to integrate the
acquisitions while CEOs A and B said integration was significantly more difficult than
expected. Reasons attributed to this difficulty included systems integration problems, an
inability to integrate and report operations, and generally poor planning for the integration.
CEOs A, B, C and E said the acquisition process definitely affected their ability to
remain focused on their businesses. CEO C noted that because the typical transaction is a
large investment:
“It has to dominate your thinking for that first period of time, so a lot of your day to
day stuff has got to be able to be delegated …”
CEO D said that the acquisition did not impact on his company’s operations as they
had a number of senior executives to ensure the core business was unaffected.
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Prior M&A experience and hindsight
The M&A literature in general concludes that acquirer’s prior acquisition experience may
enhance acquisition performance. Our CEOs agreed with this proposition with CEOs A, C, D
and Egiving an emphatic yes to this question. CEO D mentioned that despite this there are
always surprises and CEO A noted that he felt that experience enables faster integration and
completion in successive transactions. CEO C stated that:
“experience is very important in this area, because, when dealing with a small
company, there’s a lot of relationship capital in there, so to speak, and a lot of
emotional stuff in there so if you don’t read that correctly, you’re liable to do a fast
integration and find that you’ve lost 50 percent of your customers in trying to be too
quick.”
The CEOs were asked to reflect on their most recent transaction experience and
comment on what they would have done differently. CEO A noted that they would have spent
more time on teamwork building between existing and new staff. CEOs C and E reiterated
that they would have aimed for better communication with all stakeholders. Additional
responses included the appointment of a champion to be responsible for the management of
the integration (CEO B), the appointment of a Chief Operating Officer (COO) to continue
operating the business as normal during the integration phase (CEO A), and commitment of
more resources to integration (CEO B).
When asked to reflect on the major lessons they have learnt from all their experiences
in M&A, CEOs B and D mentioned the importance of having staff skilled in various aspects
of M&A. Other responses included keeping a tight timeframe and control of costs (CEO A),
being more aggressive in planning synergy (CEO A), and organising to integrate systems and
processes quickly (CEO B). With respect to communication and cultural issues CEO C
commented that they had learnt that they are buying goodwill and the loyalty of a customer
base. They offered this advice to companies proposing to engage in future M&As:
“Be clear with expectations … engage in communication regularly at all management
levels, reassure suppliers that you will continue purchasing”.
CEO E noted they have learnt to pay more attention to the management of the
acquired business to ensure smooth integration and spend more time on alleviating HR issues.
Discussion
The results of the interviews indicate significant commonality between the very small
unlisted companies’ experiences of M&A examined here and several of the findings of
studies involving large publicly listed company M&A transactions.
With respect to issues concerning cultural incompatibility, the responses here were
consistent with the findings of existing studies in the M&A literature, in noting cultural
incompatibility as a significant barrier to successful integration (Appelbaum et al. 2000;
Clemente & Greenspan 1999; Huang & Kleiner 2004; Lynch & Lind 2002; Schraeder & Self,
2003). Additionally, the importance of clear and frequent communication to reduce employee
stress, integrate cultures and retain customers was consistent with the existing literature on
M&A (for example, Appelbaum et al. 2000). Indeed, one could reasonably expect cultural
compatibility and good communication may be even more important for small companies
than larger ones. Small companies often rely on a handful of clients and key staff for their
success. Furthermore, an ageing labour-force in most western countries has meant talent
retention is increasingly important.
Past research has noted the difficulty experienced by senior management in remaining
focused throughout the M&A process (Huang & Kleiner 2004); a challenge highlighted by
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most of our companies. However most did not outsource any integration functions firstly due
to a fear of losing control over the M&A process and secondly due to limited financial
resources. Consistent with the literature on larger public company M&A (Roberts 1999;
Vester 2002;) our CEOs supported the notion that integration should be pushed quickly. In
short, companies wanted faster integration but felt hamstrung in their ability to do so.
This paucity of resources in small companies compared with large businesses,
particularly with respect to M&A transactions, has received minor attention in the literature
(see for example Frankel 2007). This may in part explain the respondent’s belief that
integration generally takes longer than expected and that most CEOs interviewed in the study
felt additional resources would be useful to facilitate the process. The importance of proper
planning, adequate resourcing and time for small companies to successfully engage in M&As
is highlighted. We have some indication here that microcap M&A acquirers systematically
underestimate the cost and time of their M&As. This is interesting particularly given that
each of the CEOs and their companies had been involved in numerous transactions.
Most of the CEOs in this study noted that the transactions they have been involved in
were successful. This is at odds with results generally reported by studies involving larger,
publicly listed companies. It is interesting to note several studies involving private company
M&A have found initial returns for acquirers stocks following the announcement of an
acquisition of private firms are statistically significantly positive and higher than those of
acquisitions involving public firms (for example Draper & Puadyal 2006; Capron & Shen
2007; Cooney, Moeller & Stegemoller 2009). Several explanations have been offered for this
including uncertainty with respect to the valuation of the target company. As stated earlier,
the acquirers in our study made several acquisitions of small private firms in the same
industry as themselves. It seems plausible that the lack of information relating to small
private firms creates difficulty in accurately evaluating their assets. This generates value
creating opportunities while the market for corporate control for public targets serves as an
information processing and asset valuation mechanism for all potential bidders (Capron &
Shen 2007).
One notable finding is that the main reason for most of the acquisitions was the desire
to obtain complementary product and services rather than short term financial gain. Small
companies engaging in M&As are typically growth firms attempting to achieve critical mass;
theirs is a long term strategic play. Despite the fact that companies were engaging in M&As
primarily to obtain complementary products and services, CEOs gauged the success of their
M&As on the basis of financial performance.
Concluding Remarks and Limitations
This paper examines the M&A experiences of microcap companies, an area largely ignored
in the literature. There were two overarching research issues which drove this exploratory
investigation. Firstly, we wanted to identify the factors that were associated with microcap
M&A success or failure. Secondly, we wanted to identify the pitfalls and problems in
microcap M&A, notably from an integration perspective. Results were contextualised with
the existing literature involving large typically listed company M&A.
A limitation to this study, common to all similar exploratory studies was the small
number of firms involved and industries represented. To some degree the fact that the
respondents and organisations had undertaken multiple transactions mitigates this limitation.
It also must be acknowledged that all of the companies involved in this study were the clients
of one advisory firm. However, despite these limitations this study is unique in its
examination of the experiences of M&A involving microcap companies whose dynamics and
resources are very different to large publicly listed firms. The challenge for future research is
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to ascertain whether the results obtained here can be generalised across other samples of
companies and continue to build on our knowledge of smaller (microcap) company M&A.
One interesting observation that comes out of this study is the high rate of transaction
success noted by CEOs. This is seemingly at odds with the CEOs’ statements that integration
generally took longer and cost more than first anticipated. The CEOs interviewed expressed
an overall desire to better resource their integration efforts including the hiring of key
personnel.
All but one of the CEOs interviewed indicated that M&A transactions distract them
from the day to day management of the business. This may seem slightly contradictory in
light of their expressed desire not to outsource integration aspects of these transactions, often
from fear of losing control. An implication of this is that further study could be undertaken to
see if outsourcing microcap M&A post integration functions does result in faster and better
integration outcomes and whether this is a cost effective strategy. Positive findings may
overcome the reluctance of management and improve organisational performance.
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Appendix A: Micro Cap M&A: An Exploratory Study Interview Questions
Question 1 What was the relative size (in percent terms) of the target/s compared to you/the
acquirer?
Question 2 What were the main reasons for the acquisition/s?
Question 3 How does your company define and measure the success of M&As?
Question 4 What are the main factors that contribute to the success or failure of an M&A?
Question 5 Has the merger/acquisition been successful from your/your company’s
perspective?
Question 6 Have the acquisitions met your financial performance expectations?
Question 7 Based on your experience, are synergies more easily achieved by cost reduction
or revenue enhancement?
Question 8 People and cultural issues are regularly cited as the main problems in the M&A
integration process. Did these issues apply to the M&As your company was involved in? In
general what were the issues?
Question 9 How did the target’s and acquirers employees cope with organisational changes?
Question 10 Cultural incompatibility is receiving increasing attention as the culprit of M&A
integration failure. Was there a divergence in cultures between the target and acquirer and
how has this been resolved?
Question 11 How important do you feel that communication is with mergers and acquisitions
involving small companies such as the ones you have been involved with?
Question 12 Did you outsource parts of the integration process by bringing in outside
expertise? Why or why not?
Question 13 Was the last target company acquired fully integrated or left as a stand-alone
entity?
Question 14 From your experience how long does the whole integration process take? Were
timelines established and were they attained?
Question 15 Was the integration more or less difficult than expected or in-line with
expectations?
Question 16 Did you find the acquisition process adversely affects your ability to remain
focused on your business?
Question 17 Do you think that prior experience in M&As helps? In what ways does it help?
Question 18 In hindsight what, if any, changes would you have implemented during the
integration phase?
Question 19 What are the major lessons that you have learned from your experiences?
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